However, in the last two weeks, the Pakistani government has reinvigorated its accusations regarding the role of the Indian external intelligence bodies, in supporting and carrying out terrorist activities in Pakistan, especially in Karachi and the Balochistan province.
The Balochistan Issue
Balochistan enjoyed a semi-autonomous status before the creation of Pakistan, a region which was distinctly proud of its language and culture. The Balochi population is spread throughout a region, which covers areas of Pakistan, Afghanistan as well as Iran. Most of the Balochi population living in Pakistan had been voicing their protest against the high handed governance of the federal government from the beginning of the 1950s. Initially, they even ICWA Issue Brief 2 | www.icwa.in demanded an independent state of Balochistan. But with the passage of time, their demand has been for more autonomy and economic independence. Balochistan province has a population of around 13 million (55% are Balochis), where only 23 per cent of the people are based in urban centres, the rest being associated with a mix of nomadic pastoralism and settled agriculture. Most of the economy is handled by non-Balochis, and areas outside Quetta mostly remain underdeveloped and impoverished in spite of being a resource rich province.
As the province shares borders with Afghanistan, small arms trafficking is rampant, making decentralised Balochi armed independence groups a serious threat to regional peace. But government inaction and suppression has led to the marginalisation of the populace, having the highest illiteracy rate and inequalities in the country. They are grossly underrepresented in the bureaucracy, government as well as the military. It is also contended by some that only two per cent of the earnings from Gwadar, which has been in the limelight for some time, will benefit the Balochis, while the rest will be shared by the Chinese and the federal government. 2 One would recall that the fifth surge of Balochi movement initiated in 2005 was triggered after the rape of a Balochi doctor in Sui, Balochistan by someone from the Pakistani Army, who was never arrested. The attempted cover up triggered large scale violence against the Defence Security Guards and the Frontier Constabulary. 3 At that time, the Pakistani authorities presented the conflict as the creation of greedy Sardars, local tribal leaders fighting for a greater share of provincial resources, who opposed development in order to preserve their own power, the outdated relic of a feudal system. 4 Today, they are squarely blaming it on international intelligence agencies, especially those from India in providing assistance to the agitation and the insurgency.
Pakistan's Policy of Suppression and Amblyopic Vision
Political analysts have stated that "Pakistani security establishment proved relatively efficient in destroying Baloch social structures, but it has been unable to impose its writ on the province, much less propose viable alternative structures. Meanwhile, the security establishment has exacerbated ethnic tensions. Insurgents have begun to attack ordinary citizens of non-Baloch ethnic background, not just Pakistan's federal agencies, and allegedly, the security establishment has lost control of its radical proxy groups." 5 Presently, most of the local officials fear that their phones are being tapped by Pakistani intelligence, 6 and the number of assassins on bikes has been on the rise, where the targets are not random, but judged on the basis of how active they are in the Balochistan movement. If the assassination of Sabeen Mahmud is taken as a case, then many analysts and human rights activists clearly accept the role of the ISI in silencing Mahmud. 7 It had been clearly stated that "Baloch political and human rights activists, lawyers, journalists and student leaders are among those, who have been targeted for enforced disappearance, abduction, arbitrary arrest and torture and other ill-treatments. The violence takes place in the context of increasing political unrest and Pakistani military operations in Balochistan." 8 Over the years, the government's repressive tactics in Balochistan has changed. 9 Military operations were stopped, but across the province, people were abducted, killed and their bodies abandoned; such acts were widely referred to as "kill and-dump" operations. These Although the military and intelligence agencies refute such accusations, the Pakistani press also reports the use of death squads, composed of Baloch guns-for-hire, resembling the Al Shams and Al Badr militias that the Pakistani military employed during the Bangladesh war. 12 The intelligence agencies allegedly created the death squads operating in Balochistan today to counter the Marris, Mengals, and Bugtis by creating confusion and disrupting their activities. Rather than adapting policies that totally sideline the development of Balochistan and its people, which might have brought the province into the process of serious dialogue, they continue following the policy of isolating the Balochis and squeezing out as much resources from the province as possible.
General Raheel Sharif has steadfastly taken a stand against advancing any peace brokerage with India. Losing his brother in the 1971 war, who remains to be the only recipient of both the Sitara-e-Jurat and Nishan-e-Haider, he has maintained an anti-Indian stand from the very beginning. He has also been an overt supporter of the various extremist and violent groups functioning within Jammu and Kashmir. 19 Though he was instrumental in giving a final shape to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, he too has started making direct allegations against Indian intelligence organisations. 20 The Pakistani establishment has argued many times that the ongoing insurgency could not have continued without the tacit support of foreign governments. The Baloch Republican Army (BRA) is composed of fighters from the Bugti tribe. Nawab Akbar Bugti or the 'Tiger of Balochistan' himself belonged to this community, who was one of the main protagonists of fighting for the Balochi identity. He was assassinated by the Pakistani security forces while the then Governor of Balochistan stated that 'the government had no intention of harming Nawab Bugti as he was a respected figure and too old to be punished'. 21 It has been alleged that Bramdagh Bugti, the grandson of Nawab Bugti, chief of the Balochistan Republican Party, is getting covert support from Indian intelligence agencies. General Musharraf stated clearly that "I know that they finance him, they give him weapons to create trouble and stab us in the back in Balochistan." 22 It has been alleged that the BRA was created with the help of external governments, particularly Afghanistan. The Afghan government, it is argued, offered safe havens to the BRA leadership; helped in arming and training the militants; and provided money for the fifty BRA camps within Balochistan. 23 The Chief Minister in Balochistan, in 2014, declared that India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) sponsors low-intensity conflict within the province by operating forty training camps for militant operations. However, not a single Indian agent has been arrested in the province, and India does not share a contiguous land border with Balochistan, making it unlikely that RAW supplied the militants with smuggled heavy weapons. 24 However, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif asked Afghan authorities to prevent RAW from creating unrest in Pakistan. Earlier, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhry, also told reporters after a function that RAW was involved in creating unrest in Pakistan. 25 The assertiveness that has been adopted by the Pakistani government shows the Pakistani army's growing willingness to be seen as dictating the country's foreign and national security policies. It also indicates toughening of Pakistan's position against India at a time, when the Pakistani army is emerging as one of the chief guarantors of peace in Afghanistan in partnership with China, while India is widening its sphere of influence, strengthening bonds with countries beyond its usual gamut of bilateral relations. 26 However, in respect of the problem of insurgency in Balochistan, there does not seem to be an easy resolution. Media analysts in Pakistan, themselves, state that the civilian as well as military leaderships in Pakistan have no clear vision regarding terrorism. "The civ-mil leaderships are now on the same page... regarding terrorism. Unfortunately, that same page seemingly is a blank page or at least an abbreviated one, as a clear, unified response remains elusive." 27 The ethno-nationalist insurgency will continue in the future, as Pakistan has demonstrated little interest in addressing the conflict's underlying root causes and, in all probability, it will continue to pursue eradicating Baloch Nationalism in all its forms. 28 With the ongoing suppression of Balochi interests and aspirations, draining their economic resources without including the indigenous people of the province in the regional economic developmental activities that the nation is pursuing and blaming international and regional intelligence agencies for the agitation, the Baloch movement will deepen the fissures within the Pakistani community, rather than unifying an already fledgling nation. ***
